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JUSTIFYING THE LINDAHL SOLUTION AS AN 





The Lindahl equilibrium is mostly motivated by a rather artificial price mechanism. Even 
though the analogy to a competitive market has been emphasised by Lindahl himself his 
approach does not directly explain the normative ideas, which are behind this concept. In the 
present paper we therefore show how the Lindahl equilibrium can be deduced from some 
simple equity axioms that in particular are related to the equal sacrifice principle and a non-
envy postulate as norms for distributional equity. Fairness among agents with different 
preferences is taken into account by considering their marginal willingnesses to pay as virtual 
prices. In this way it might also become more understandable why the Lindahl solution can be 
perceived as an outcome of fair cooperation. 
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A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at seminars at the Universities of 
Chemnitz and Linz. We thank the participants of these seminars for their helpful comments. 
Many thanks also to Todd Sandler who has made important suggestions to improve the paper.   1 
 
1. Motivation  
The Lindahl equilibrium is one of the most prominent concepts in the theory of public goods 
that, in the context of the intensified interest in transnational public goods as combating 
global warming, has attained more attention in the last years
1.  According to Lindahl’s con-
cept every agent acts as a cost-share taker who, being confronted with an adequately chosen 
individualised price, wants to consume the same amount of the public good. The allocation 
characterised in this way is Pareto efficient and thus the Lindahl solution is quite parallel to a 
competitive market equilibrium for private goods. The attractiveness of Lindahl’s construc-
tion mainly lies in this analogy, which is mostly used to provide the motivation for the con-
cept
2.  Based on a purely artificial price mechanism this usual justification of the Lindahl 
equilibrium, however, is not directly linked to the allocation problem as stated by Lindahl 
(1919/1958) himself: How much of a public good should be provided and how should the 
costs of the public good be shared among the agents such that the resulting allocation can be 
considered as “just” and can thus be expected as the outcome of a “free agreement” between 
the agents involved? 
 In the literature there are a few attempts to bridge this gap and to provide an alternative 
motivation for the Lindahl equilibrium referring to equity or fairness concepts. In Silvestre’s 
(1984) voluntariness approach the Lindahl outcome was identified as an allocation in which 
no agent would prefer to get a reduction of public-good supply accompanied by a proportional 
reduction of its contribution to the public good. Sato (1987), by a specific construction, char-
acterized the Lindahl solution as an envy-free allocation in which no agent would want to 
interchange its position with someone else. Van den Nouweland, Tijs and Wooders (2002) 
motivate the Lindahl solution by a consistency requirement, and in the approach of Bilodeau 
and Gravel (2004), Lindahlian cost sharing turns out to be a special case of a general class of 
cost-sharing rules that fulfil some Kantian maxim of equal treatment.  
 Notwithstanding these contributions it is not quite transparent what the normative un-
derpinnings of the Lindahl solution are that should make it appealing as a potential outcome 
of fair cooperation. In this note we therefore want to show how in the standard public-good 
model with a summation technology (like in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986, and Cornes 
and Sandler, 1996) the Lindahl solution can be based directly on simple equity conditions the 
most well-known of which is the benefit principle. Following its classical interpretation, eve-
                                                 
1 Some prominent examples are Chichilnisky and Heal (1994), Sandler (2004) and in particular Uzawa (2003). 
2 For details see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, pp. 509-512), Myles (1995, pp. 271-277) and Cornes and Sandler 
(1996, pp. 201-203).   2 
ryone should pay for a public good according to his marginal willingness to pay. For each 
individual this means a “quid pro quo”-exchange as it is given in competitive markets for pri-
vate goods. In this paper we want to show in addition that, in the case of public goods, the 
benefit principle can be related to equity norms concerning the distribution of public-good 
contributions among the parties. So, in particular, we assume that in the solution agreed upon 
each agent should carry the same burden for financing the public good after differences in 
willingness to pay have been taken into account. It turns out that this postulate for distribu-
tional equity combined with Pareto efficiency leads to the Lindahl equilibrium without invok-
ing a Walrasian auctioneer. The relationship between equity postulates and the Lindahl equi-
librium partly seems to be some kind of “common knowledge” in the theory of public goods. 
The aim of this paper is to make the intuition behind more explicit and thus to give a more 
transparent and sound normative foundation of the Lindahl solution.  
 
2. Axiomatic Characterisations of the Lindahl Solution 
We consider a standard public-good economy with  n agents. Each agent  i has an exoge-
nously given income  i y . Preferences are characterized by the utility function  (,) ii uxG where 
0 i x ‡  denotes agent  i’s private consumption and  0 G ‡  is the provision level of a public 
good. All utility functions are assumed to have the usual properties: they are strict monoto-
nously increasing in both types of consumption, twice continuously differentiable for (xi ,G) > 
0, strictly quasi-concave, and the private as well as the public good are non-inferior. By 
iii gyx =-  we denote agent i’s contribution to the public good, which is the part of  i’s in-
come that is spent for providing the public good. By assuming a linear technology, which 
transforms one unit of private into one unit of public consumption, we can normalise  1 mrt = . 









=￿             (1) 
 
which is a self-financing condition and corresponds to a balanced public budget.     3 
 For any  (,) i xG > 0  agent i’s marginal rate of substitution between the public and the 








 . Or, putting it differently,  (,) ii xG p  measures 
agent i’s marginal willingness to pay for the public good at (,) i xG.  
 Given  n agents with preferences represented by  1 (,...,) n uu  and strictly positive in-
come levels  1 (,...,) n yy  the mechanism L defines a vector of Lindahl prices ( 1 ,...,
LL
n pp ) such 
that, if  
L G  denotes public-good supply in the Lindahl equilibrium, each agent i maximises 
utility  (,)
L
iii uypGG -  by choosing the public-good level 
L G  and then has private consump-
tion 
LLL
iii xypG =- . If we additionally assume that the indifference curves of all agents do 




3. In contrast to  L, let  M  denote some general allocation mechanism which, 
for given preferences  1 (,...,) n uu  and strictly positive income levels  1 (,...,), n yy  appoints a spe-
cific allocation  1 (,...,,)
MMM








= ￿ . Addi-
tionally, we suppose that the selected allocation is interior (0
M
ii xy <<  for all  i, and 
0
M G > ). This assumption characterises minimal fairness requirements, as it excludes two 
rather strange financing conditions for the public good. On the one hand, agent  i must not 
suffer from having no private consumption. Hence, the mechanism M does not allow a full 
exploitation of agent i through the other agents. On the other hand, each agent does not get a 
free lunch and thus has to bear at least a small cost share of financing the public good. 
 Besides feasibility, we now want to impose some additional properties which the 
mechanism  M  should fulfil. As we are interested in an efficient and somehow fair mecha-
nism, these conditions are meant to incorporate some basic normative ideas. The first axiom is 
the uncontroversial efficiency postulate.  
 
Efficiency (EF):  The allocation  1 (,...,,)
MMM
n xxG  is Pareto optimal.  
 
 The axiom EF implies that for the allocation picked out by  M  the Samuelson condi-
tion holds, such that the sum of marginal rates of substitution of the  n agents equals the mar-
ginal rate of transformation: 
                                                 











= ￿ .           (2) 
 
 The other class of axioms we are now going to formulate reflects equity considera-
tions, which refer to agents’ contributions (or cost shares) when financing the public good. To 
base equity directly on the individual contributions 
M
i g  measured in units of the private good 
is clearly inappropriate, as this would not take different preferences for the public good into 
account - which does not seem fair. Spending the same amount of income for the public good 
means a higher subjective burden for an agent who does not receive much benefit from the 
public good and thus has a low willingness to pay for it
4.  A fair mechanism has to incorpo-
rate such concerns. To correct for the effect of different individual valuations, contributions 
have to be converted into commensurable equivalents before an equity maxim can reasonably 
be applied. This transformation is done in a standard way by applying the marginal rates of 
substitution of the different agents as virtual public-good prices
5.  
 Equity may now be captured in various ways, so first by directly imposing the benefit 
principle
6 in its classical interpretation. As an equity maxim related to the Lindahl solution 
this is closest to the existing literature. 
 




iii gxGG p =           (3) 
 
holds for all individuals. 
 
 This axiom means that every individual has to spend that share of its income for the 
public good, which – according to the individual’s marginal willingness to pay – is equivalent 
                                                 
4 See already Wicksell (1896/1958, p. 77) for this argument where he identified the group with small willingness 
to pay to the public good with the “lower class”. 
5 For a fundamental criticism of using marginal valuations for comparing public-good contributions, however, 
see Brennan (1976, 1981). 
6 For a general discussion of the benefit principle see already Wicksell (1896/1958), Musgrave (1959, pp. 61-89) 
and more recently Sandler (2004, pp. 77-79), referring especially to the provision of international public goods, 
and Silvestre (2004, pp. 535-536).    5 
to the amount of the public good provided under  M
7.  In the sense of “value and counter-
value”, everyone pays what he gets. On competitive markets for private goods this benefit 
principle is automatically fulfilled which provides the basis for considering market exchange 
as just. 
  It is an important message of the present paper that BP can be deduced from other eq-
uity axioms that are related to concepts of a fair burden sharing among individuals, i.e. to dis-
tributional equity relative to the individual contributions. 
 













=            (4) 
 
holds for all pairs of individuals. 
 
  This axiom means that the cost shares of the agents in financing the public good are 
proportional to their marginal willingness to pay
8. The higher an agent’s willingness to pay of 
an agent, the higher is the contribution to the public good he should make if mechanism  M  is 
applied. In this sense, everyone pays according to his preferences for the public good which-
seems to be a fair cost-sharing rule when agents are different. 
 Lindahl (1919/1958, pp. 171-172) gave some algebraic treatment of the special case 
where the utility functions are quasi-linear, i.e.  (,)() iiii uxGxfG =+ .   Then condition (4) re-
quires that cost shares are proportional to the individual marginal utilities  ()
M
i fG ¢  of the pub-
lic good at  .
M G  As for quasi-linear preferences income effects do not matter, Lindahl’s ex-
ample focuses on differences in individual tastes. 
                                                 
7 Sandler (2004, p. 78) interprets the benefit principle in this way by saying that it “requires that a good’s recipi-
ents pay their marginal willingness to pay (MWTP)”. To Sandler this is one of the “essential principles that 
guide taxation at the national level and can be applied to TPGs [transnational public goods, W. B. and W. P.] at 
the supranational level”. See also Wicksell (1896/1958, p. 75) who proposes “rejecting any public expenditure, 
along with its companion tax levy, which failed to render each taxpayer a service corresponding to his payment. 
Justice would thereby be done at least to the extent that each man received his money’s worth.” A critical discus-
sion of this specific version of the benefit principle is given by Hines (2000) who also suggests another interpre-
tation of the benefit principle. See also Kaplow (2003, esp. pp. 8-9) for a discussion of the benefit principle.  
8 Moulin (1995, p. 243 and pp. 286-288) interprets this condition as being some other version of the benefit prin-
ciple, but doesn’t take it as a starting point for characterising Lindahl equilibria. An illuminating discussion of 
the normative background of this cost-sharing rule is also in Moulin (1995, pp. 22-26). Moulin’s (1987) own 
approach for making a selection among Pareto-optimal public good allocations by egalitarian-equivalent cost 
sharing can be interpreted as still another version of the benefit principle (see Hines, 2000). 
   6 
  If agent  j  has a stronger preference for the public good than agent  i, i.e. if 
()() ji fGfG ¢¢ >  holds for all  0, G >  then condition (4) implies  .
MM
ji gg >  This conforms to an 
intuitive requirement of vertical equity as the agent with the higher interest in the public good 
has to pay more for it if PC is assumed. 
 As a contrasting example consider the case where the agents have general but identical 
preferences. Then vertical equity demands that the agent with the higher income makes a 
higher contribution to the public good, which – as a normative postulate – can also be inter-
preted as a variant of the venerable ability-to-pay-principle. If PC is assumed it follows from 
(4) that mechanism  M  has this property in case of normal preferences. (See the Appendix for 
a precise proof.) So in a public-good economy the axiom PC implies a close relationship be-
tween two essential norms for just taxation or just burden sharing: the benefit principle on the 
one hand and the ability-to-pay principle on the other. 
  The axiom PC can also be reformulated in a somewhat different way. 
 
Equality of Sacrifice (ES):  Under the mechanism  M  
 









=              (5) 
 
holds for all individuals. 
 
 This axiom means that, under the mechanism  , M  everyone bears the same burden 
when financing the public good. Before a comparison of individual contributions is made the 
monetary contribution 
M
i g  of each agent i is normalised through an adjustment for different 
preferences such that the individual burden is measured in public-good equivalents. This 
axiom implies an “equal sacrifice” in private consumption for all agents involved. 
 The following result shows how these axioms can be combined to justify the Lindahl 
solution.  
 
Proposition: The following characterizations of the allocation mechanism  M  are equiva-
lent: 
  (i)  ML =  
  (ii)  M  fulfills BP   7 
  (iii)  M  fulfills PC and EF 
  (iv)  M  fulfills ES and EF 
 
Proof:  (i) ￿ (ii):  This is obvious according to the properties of  L. 
 
(ii) ￿ (i):  Given  M , let each individual  i be confronted with the individual public-good 
price  :(,).
MMM
iii pxG p =   Then, by  BP and 
MM
iii gyx =- , we have  ,
MMM
iii yxpG =+  i.e.  
(,)
MM
i xG  lies on the budget line of individual i given  i y  and  .
M
i p  As   (,)
MMM
iii pxG p =  the 
consumption bundle  (,)
MM
i xG  is utility maximising for agent  i. Given the price vector 
1 (,...,)
MM
n pp  all price-taking agents would then choose the same public-good level  .
M G  As 
the Lindahl equilibrium is uniquely determined, then 
ML GG = and 
M
i p   must be equal to 
agent i’s Lindahl price 
L
i p  such that ML =  holds. 
 
(ii)  ￿ (iv):  ES trivially follows from BP if we take 
M G  as the constant on the right hand 













Łł ￿￿  
 
such that cancelling 
M G  on both sides gives the Samuelson condition and thus EF. 
 
(iv)  ￿ (ii):  It follows from EF (i.e. the Samuelson formula (2)), ES and the self-financing 
constraint (1)  that for each agent i the constant term on the right hand side of (5) must be 
identical to the public-good supply 
M G : 
 
  
   
 
 
      
 


























=== ￿  
(1)   8 
(iii) ￿  (iv): Obvious.         QED. 
 
 That (i) implies (ii), has already been observed by Lindahl (1919/1958 p. 173) in the 
special case of quasi-linear preferences and has been taken up by the subsequent literature 
(see Musgrave, 1959, p. 77). The converse  [ (ii) ￿ (i) ] seems to be some folk theorem in 
the theory of public goods (see, e.g., Musgrave, 1985, p. 17) for which an explicit statement 
highlighting the normative significance of “equality in exchange”, however, is hard to find
9. 
The other result stated in the Proposition  [ (iv)  ￿ (ii) ] says that the benefit principle in its 
standard version can, in the case of public-good allocation, also be interpreted as a conse-
quence of a conceptually different normative judgement that focuses on a balanced burden 
sharing among the parties. Thus, the main message of the present paper is that there exists a 
close relationship between distributive justice, the traditional benefit principle, and conse-
quently with the Lindahl concept.  
 Note that in contrast to the conventional characterization of the Lindahl solution 
Pareto optimality is not an implication but an assumption in conditions (iii) and (iv) of the 
Proposition. Without EF the equity axioms ES (or PC) alone would not entail the Lindahl 
solution. Just look at the case in which there are two completely identical agents. This sym-
metry implies that ES and PC are fulfilled when both agents make identical contributions. 
However, the Lindahl equilibrium is a distinct element within the whole set of symmetric al-
locations. 
 In the special case with two agents, condition (iv) of the Proposition can be illustrated 
in the standard diagram, where we depict agents’ cost shares  1 g  and  2 g  on  both axes (see 
Cornes and Sandler, 1996, p. 202). The 1 g - 2 g -combinations along the line  12 PP  represent all 
Pareto optima where both agents’ indifference curves touch each other. The common tangent 











10. Then, PC together with EF defines that point  12 (,)
MM gg on the  12 PP -
                                                 
9 For some more detailed theoretical discussion on the relationship between the benefit principle and Lindahl 
equilibrium see Aaron and Mc Guire (1970).  
















==  where the last equality 
follows from the Samuelson condition.   9 

















The axioms underlying the Proposition can slightly be weakened. So BP can be substituted by 
the postulate that under a mechanism  M  the inequality  
 
    (,)
MM
iii gxG p £ G                                                     (7) 
 
holds for each agent. This means that no one should pay more for the public good than what 
he receives as a public-good equivalent. If condition (7) is now combined with EF we obtain 











M G =  would not hold. By the 
Proposition, this implies  ML = .  In the special case of a linear technology as considered 
here, condition (7) is equivalent to Silvestre’s (1984) voluntariness postulate: Define 
:
MMM
ii sgG =  as agent  i’s public-good cost share under  . M  Given (7), agent  i prefers 
(,)
MM
i xG  over all points on the budget line 
M
iii xsGy +=  for which  .
M GG <  These points 
can be described by  (,)
MM
ii ygG ll -  where  [0,1), l˛  such that agent  , i  starting from 
                                                 
11 Starting from condition (iv) this graphical presentation does not make use of Lindahlian reaction curves that, 
however, are needed to prove existence of the Lindahl solution in the diagram.   
Figure 1 
0 
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M g = 1
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1 g  
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2
M g = 2
L g    10 
(,),
MM
i xG  does not want to have a proportional reduction of public-good supply and its indi-
vidual contribution to the public good. This, however, is just Silvestre’s voluntariness axiom.  
 The axiom ES can be relaxed in a similar way by postulating that for any pair of 














£            (8) 
 
is valid for the allocation chosen by mechanism  . M  By simply interchanging the indices  i 
and  j  it is clear that (8) implies (5) and thus ES. Condition (8) says that no agent i would 
prefer to have the contribution level 
M
j g  attributed by  M  to some other agent  j  when  i, 
being confronted with this hypothetical choice, is simultaneously forced to take differences in 
marginal willingness to pay into account. 
 With this interpretation axiom ES becomes a non-envy postulate
12: Given the alloca-
tion mechanism  M  no one wants to change roles to get the contribution level of someone else 
if he simultaneously has to respect the other’s preferences. In this way the parties are treated 
quite symmetrically. Under this fairness proviso, no one can legitimately protest against the 
conditions that are imposed on him in the cooperative arrangement through the mechanism 
. M  This gives some reason to identify the Lindahl solution with the outcome of fair coopera-
tion without using Lindahl’s own bargaining model that is based on a rather specific and “un-
convincing” construction (Silvestre, 2004, p. 528). If the parties are fairness-oriented in a 
strict sense they will not accept an offer that removes them to a less advantageous position 
relative to the other parties
13. In voluntary agreements, which are reached by truly fair nego-
tiations, there is no tolerance for unilateral privileges. Only then can we legitimately suppose 




                                                 
12 For another more complicated application of Varian’s (1974) non-envy approach to public-good provision see 
Sato (1987) who uses the special and intricate notion of L-fairness but also uses marginal willingness to pay as 
the basis of comparison. 
13 In this spirit is also the short remark by Romer (1995, p.14): “For once interpersonal bargaining occurs, then 
notions of fairness may be required to describe its outcome, as a bargainer may refuse to accept an offer because 
he views it as unfair, a conclusion he may reach, inter alia, by making some comparison of his gain compared 
with his adversary’s.” 
14 So Lindahl (1919/1958, p. 169) states that if a “party has defended its own interests better than the other par-
ties… power is not distributed evenly.”   11 
3. Conclusion 
The purpose of the Lindahl concept is to find a cooperative solution for a public-good econ-
omy that is voluntarily accepted by all agents involved. Unanimous approval over public-
good supply, however, can only be expected when the parties consider the underlying cost-
sharing rule as equitable. Even though fair burden sharing played a central role in Lindahl’s 
own reasoning and the ensuing discussion of his approach, maxims concerning distributional 
equity are not explicitly used as the starting point for a motivation of the Lindahl equilibrium. 
Therefore, our analysis first of all should be helpful for elucidating the Lindahl solution as a 
“normative concept” (see Varian, 1978, p. 200, and Inman, 1987, p. 681). Moreover, in this 
way the Lindahl allocation mechanism might be brought more into line with fair cooperation, 
which Lindahl actually had in mind
15.  
 Considering provision of international public goods, like mitigating climate change, 
negotiation over public goods among independent agents has become a much more important 
topic in public-good theory as compared to the traditional situation in which public goods are 
provided by a single government. From this perspective Lindahl’s thought experiment is not 
only of theoretical but also of practical interest as it might improve our understanding of how 
a bargaining solution on public goods might look like when fairness is seen as a prerequisite 
for an agreement.  
 Implementing the Lindahl solution, however, requires knowledge on the preferences 
of the agents involved, i.e. on their willingness to pay (see Cornes and Sandler, 1996, pp. 214-
221, for a detailed discussion on this problem). From the very beginning the Lindahl concept 
has been plagued with this inherent problem of an efficient provision of public goods. This 
explains why a vast theoretical and empirical literature on preference revelation has emerged 
since awareness of environmental problems has increased. Concerning international public 
goods in particular the question arises whether the problem of asymmetric information be-
comes more or less serious when only a small number of governments is involved in negotia-
tions. Discussing this quite controversial question
16 is outside the framework of this paper, 
which concentrates on motivating the Lindahl solution as a cooperative outcome under ideal 
conditions usually assumed in the literature. 
 
                                                 
15 See Musgrave (1959, pp. 63-77) for an illuminating review of the history of economic thought concerning the 
relationship between contractual arrangements, or, specifically the “contract theory of the state”, and equity 
according to the benefit principle. In particular, Musgrave in this context refers to A. Smith’s first principle of 
taxation.  
16 For arguments that might be relevant in this context see e.g., Musgrave (1959, p. 80) and Johansen (1977).   12 
Appendix 
Axiom PC and Ability to Pay 
In the case of identical preferences  (,) i xG p  denotes the common  mrs -function of all agents. 
It follows from normality that  (,) i xG p  is increasing in  i x   given any arbitrary level of  G  
such that private consumption and the marginal willingness to pay for the public good change 
in the same direction (see already Kovenock and Sadka, 1981). As a consequence, the axiom 
PC, i.e. condition (4), implies that 
MM
ji gg >  holds if and only if 
MM
ji xx > . If agent  j  has a 
higher income than agent  i  () ji yy >  this gives 
MM
ji gg >  and 
MM
ji xx >  since otherwise  
MMMM
jjjiii gxygxy +=£+=  would be obtained. 
 As a by-product of these considerations we immediately get the result that no “rank-
reversal” can occur when a mechanism  M  satisfying PC and EF (and henceforth  ) ML =  is 
applied:  ji yy >  implies 
LL
ji xx >  and thus  (,)(,)
LLLL
ji uxGuxG > . Thus, in the Lindahl equi-
librium the agent with the higher income enjoys the higher welfare level. Therefore, an impor-
tant objection raised by Brennan (1976, 1981) against the Lindahl solution is not valid when 
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